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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis we model and analyze a series of closed loop supply chains to study the 
relationships among remanufacturability and profitability of each member of the supply 
chain. We also study the relationships among remanufacturability, government subsidy, and 
government penalty. In each model, we assume that the closed loop supply chain consists of 
a manufacturer who manufactures as well as collects used products and remanufactures and a 
retailer who in turn sells the products to her consumers. Also, we assume that the level of 
remanufacturability is a variable that is controllable via the level of investment of 
remanufacturing technology and equipment. Furthermore, in the case of government subsidy 
and penalty, we assume that the government provides a level of subsidy per remanufactured 
product and finances the subsidy by collecting an advance recovery fee per unit sold from the 
retailer. Throughout this thesis, we also assume that the manufacturer behaves as the leader 
and the retailer as the follower under a Stackelberg game framework and the model 
environment is captured in a static framework regarding manufacturing and remanufacturing. 
Numerous managerial insights and economic implications are obtained. For example, the 
manufacturer’s profit may actually decrease with respect to the collection rate if the 
collection rate is low in the case of no government intervention in the form of the subsidy 
and penalty. Also, the government may be able to increase the total surplus consisting of all 
the profits of the supply chains and the consumer surplus by determining the appropriate 
level of the fee unit remanufactured subsidy and the fee unit sold advance recovery fee.  
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Remanufacturing is a production strategy to recover the residual value of used 
products by reusing components that are still functioning well. Remanufactured products can 
be obtained by collecting used products and replacing worn out components with new ones 
(Thierry et al. 1995). Also, Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) define remanufacturing as the 
process of disassembling used items, inspecting and repairing/reworking the components, 
and using these in new product manufacture. We define remanufacturability in our model as 
the fraction of used products that can be remanufactured and consider that the 
remanufacturability can be improved via fixed cost investment in technology.  
An alternative approach to obtain environmental and economic studies is to increase 
the remanufacturability by government intervention. The European Union (EU) has adopted 
a Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) such that, effective 
August 2005, EU member states must establish collection systems for electrical and 
electronics waste (Webster and Mitra 2007). There are State E-Waste Legislations in the U.S. 
The specific example in our model is State of Oregon E-Waste Legislation. It requires 
retailers to charge first in-state buyers of electronic devices an ARF (Advanced Recovery 
Fee) of up to $10 to pay for the collection, reuse and recycling of products. The state DEQ 
(Department of Environmental Quality) will set the fee and deposit it into an Electronic 
Product Stewardship Account. The department is to monitor the cost of performing the 
required services and meeting performance goals, and may adjust the fee once a year.  
The purpose of this study is to model and analyze the remanufacturability when the 
manufacturer collects used products directly from consumers in a manufacturer-retailer (MR) 
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closed loop supply chain. Furthermore based on this framework (MR model), we introduce 
the government penalty to the consumer (ARF) and subsidy to the manufacturer for 
remanufacturing. 
The specific research objectives are 1) To identify the conditions under which it is 
beneficial to have higher remanufacturability given to the collection rate, 2) To investigate 
how supply chain coordination between the manufacturer and the retailer impacts on the 
remanufacturability, prices, and profits, 3) To analyze the impact of environmental 
legislation that penalizes retail purchasing of products to the consumers and subsidizes 
remanufacturing to the manufacturer.  
For this study, we focused on the closed loop supply chain consisting of the 
manufacturer who collects used products from the consumers and retailer who in turns sells 
the manufacturer’s products to the consumers. As the result of this paper, we found that the 
cost savings from remanufacturing and collection rate from the market condition have a 
critical impact on the manufacturer’s decision. Also, we considered the government 
intervention (the government penalty and subsidy system) based on the closed loop supply 
chain and assumed that the total amount of penalty from the consumers is equal to the total 
amount of subsidy for remanufacturing as the non-profit organization. We showed that under 
the government revenue neutrality when the government increases the subsidy for 
remanufacturing to the manufacturer, the manufacturer’s profit will be decreased due to the 
penalty to the consumers. Thus the lump-sum transfer money incentive may be provided to 
the manufacturer to increase the manufacturer’s profit as well as the remanufacturability.   
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we show how our model is 
derived and different from previous literature. Chapter 3 presents the assumptions, notations 
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and derivation of the manufacturer-retailer (MR model) and the centrally coordinated (CC 
model). We solve the equilibrium of the models and compare the equilibrium solutions of 
MR model with the solutions with CC model. Then by numerical example we discuss some 
managerial insights. In chapter 4 we propose the manufacturer-retailer with government 
(MRG model) and the centrally coordinated with government (CCG model) where the 
government imposes ARF to the consumers at the point of retail purchase and subsidizes the 
fee for remanufacturing. Also, we solve the equilibrium of the models and compare the 
equilibrium solutions of MRG model with the solutions with CCG model. Then by numerical 
example we discuss some managerial insights. In chapter 5 we show the total surplus that the 
government finds the optimal value of subsidy that maximizes the government’s objective as 
total surplus maximization. Chapter 6 concludes our findings and suggests future research.  
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Product remanufacturing after its end-of life has received much research attention in 
the recent years. There is extensive literature regarding the relationship among manufacturer, 
retailer, and collector, analyzing how it influences the retail price, collection rate, 
remanufacturing, and channel profit.  
Majumder and Groenvelt (2001) study a two-period horizontal competition model for 
remanufacturing in which an OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) who manufactures 
new products and also remanufactures competes with a local remanufacturer under different 
allocation mechanisms for returns. Also, they proposed a model where, even though the 
consumers cannot tell if a product is new or remanufactured by the OEM, they value 
products sold by the OEM more than those sold by the local remanufacturer. They find that 
an increase in the fraction available for remanufacturing does not necessarily increase OEM 
profit. Thus, regulation and taxation incentives may be provided to the OEM to increase 
remanufacturing activities.  
Ferguson and Totay (2005) develop a two-period model with a monopolist 
manufacturer in the first period and duopoly of manufacturer and remanufacturer in the 
second period. They show the internal cannibalization effect of remanufactured products on 
an OEM’s new product sales. They also analyze a collection strategy wherein the OEM 
chooses to collect the used product (with no intention of remanufacturing) to deter entrant. 
Further, when remanufacturing costs are low and the manufacturer also remanufactures, the 
manufacturer sells more in the first period to increase returns in the second period in order to 
benefit from remanufacturing.  
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Debo et al. (2005) consider an industry with a manufacturer who may also sell 
remanufactured product and potentially multiple independent remanufacturers. They identify 
conditions under which a monopolist will invest in technologies to make a product suitable 
for remanufacturing so as to produce both new and remanufactured product, and they identify 
how these conditions change when independent remanufacturers may enter the market to 
compete with the manufacturer.  
Savaskan et al. (2004) address the problem of choosing a suitable channel structure 
for the collection of end-of-life returns from customers. They assume that customer cannot 
distinguish a new product from a remanufactured product, i.e., ink-cartridges and single-use 
cameras. They consider a manufacturer with three options: (1) undertake the collection effort 
himself, (2) provide suitable rewards to the retailer to undertake the collection efforts, (3) 
subcontract the collection effort to a third party. They also explore the implication of these 
different reverse channel structures on pricing decisions and supply chain profits. Their 
research shows that agencies closer to the customer are most effective in the collection effort 
for the manufacturer.  
Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) analyze the trade-offs between centralization 
and decentralization of the product collection activity. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg 
leader, and two retailers compete on price in close loop frame work. In the centralized 
system, the manufacturer collects used products directly from the consumers (e.g., as in print 
and copy cartridge) whereas in the decentralized system, the two retailers collect the product 
returns (e.g., as in a single-use cameras and cellular phones). The decentralization of product 
collection activities result in incentives for retailers to reduce their margins with the 
expectation of compensation through buyback payments for returned products.  
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Jung and Hwang (2007) study a remanufacturing in a reverse logistics chain with one 
OEM and one remanufacturer under take-back requirement. The environmental legislative 
pressure like EPR (Extended Producer Responsibility) requires firms to take back the used 
products from end-users for remanufacturing so that they consider the penalty charged per 
unit, in case that the obligatory take-back quota is breached. They show that the 
remanufacturers can be a potential competitor for the OEMs by cannibalizing the sales of the 
OEM’s new product but the OEMs have the advantage of being free of take-back quota when 
remanufactures are active in collecting end-of-use products.  
State in the United States concerns specific to the landfill disposal or incineration of 
e-waste are largely due to its increasing volume and often bulky nature; hazardous 
constituents, such as lead and mercury, it may contain; its high cost of recycling; and the 
inability of interested stakeholders, such as electronics retailers and manufacturers, to reach 
consensus on how to voluntarily implement a national e-waste management system. Luther 
(2007) shows how states respond to this concern by enacting their own e-waste management 
laws and the overview of enacted state legislation. Also the paper explains a mechanism to 
fund the program (the consumer pays model which is represented as ARF and the producer 
pays model which is represented as EPR).  
This paper builds on the above models and analyses. We assume a single period 
game-theoretic model and no difference between new and remanufactured product as in 
Savaskan et al. (2004). However, our focus is on the level of the remanufacturability. We 
propose a manufacturer and retailer model that the manufacturer considers his 
remanufacturability instead of focusing on the collection of the used products. Furthermore 
we show the role of government that collects fee (ARF) from the consumers and subsidizes it 
  
 
7
to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. To our knowledge, this linkage (penalty to 
consumer and subsidy for remanufacturing) has not been captured in prior literature. Because 
the ARF in our model is just beginning to go into effect and may become increasingly 
prevalent, our insights into the impact of these environmental laws are relevant for the 
government policy-makers and managers.   
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CHAPTER 3.  MANUFACTURER-RETAILER MODEL (MR) 
Savaskan et al. (2004) address the problem of choosing a suitable channel structure 
for collection of end-of-life returns from consumers. In this chapter we propose a 
manufacturer-retailer model that the manufacturer considers his remanufacturability instead 
of focusing on the collection of the used products. An important feature of our model is the 
option for the manufacturer to invest in remanufacturability, the fraction of products that may 
be economically remanufactured. Investment in remanufacturing equipment and processes 
may facilitate the remanufacturing of product subassemblies that are too difficult or 
expensive to remanufacture. Sundin and Bras (2005) studied remanufacturing process of 
several companies and found that cleaning and inspection were often the most time 
consuming steps of the remanufacturing process. Automation of these steps was 
recommended to reduce the processing time. Recently Xerox replaced its traditional cleaning 
technology with carbon dioxide blasting which lead to reduced cleaning times as well as 
improved part recovery rates (Xerox 2005). 
In this paper we investigate manufacturer-retailer closed loop supply chain model 
with variable remanufacturability. The key research objectives under this circumstance are, 
1) How the collection rate impacts on the remanufacturability? 
2) How supply chain competition and coordination between the manufacturer and 
retailer impact on the remanufacturability, prices, and profits? 
In order to answer these questions, we set up a steady-state model to analyze the 
manufacturer-retailer closed loop supply chain.  
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3.1  Model Assumptions and Notations 
This thesis considers a steady-state model with two players: the manufacturer and the 
retailer. We formulate and analyze a manufacturer-retailer closed loop supply chain model 
that the manufacturer collects used products from consumers and remanufactures. For 
example, Xerox Corporation provides prepaid mailboxes so that the consumers can return 
their used copy or print cartridges. The manufacturer-retailer (MR) model is illustrated in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Illustration of Manufacturer-Retailer Model  
MR model consists of a manufacturer who manufactures as well as remanufactures 
his products and a retailer who in turn sells the manufacturer’s products to her consumers. 
The retailer charges a price p  per unit to consumers so that the retailer faces a demand of 
q pβ γ= −  units of product where β  and γ  are parameters which denote the maximum 
demand for products and the decrease in demand for a unit increase in price p  respectively. 
MR Model  
Manufacturer 
Retailer 
Consumers 
qτ
w
p
q pβ γ= −
Decides 
,w R
Decides 
p
Forward flow 
Reverse flow 
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Linear demand functions have been widely used in supply chain literature (McGuire and 
Staelin 2008, Choi 1991, Savaskan et al. 2004).  
We formulate this closed loop supply chain as a Stackelberg game with the 
manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. The Stackelberg game is 
appropriate for modeling a dominant supply chain member as it typically results in a higher 
profit to the leader due to the advantage of choosing his strategies first. Notations used in this 
chapter are explained below: 
w : The wholesale price decided by the manufacturer (dollars per product); 
p : The retail price decided by the retailer (dollars per product); 
mc : The manufacturing cost for each new product (dollars per new product); 
r
c : The remanufacturing cost for each remanufactured product (dollars per remanufactured 
product); 
∆ : The cost savings (dollars per product), m rc c∆ = − ; 
τ : The collection rate of used products from consumers ( 0 1τ< < ); 
R : The remanufacturability decided by the manufacturer, the fraction of the used products 
that can be economically remanufactured ( *0 1R< < ); 
cc : The collection cost (dollars per product); 
k : The scaling parameter for remanufacturing; 
q : The demand function without government’s subsidy and penalty ( q pβ γ= − ); 
MR
Rpi : The retailer’s profit in MR model; 
MR
Mpi : The manufacturer’s profit in MR model; 
  
 
11
MR
Cpi : The total channel profit in MR model ( MR MR MRC R Mpi pi pi= + ); 
CC
Cpi : The centrally coordinated planner’s profit in CC model; 
In order to model the manufacturer-retailer closed loop supply chain with the variable 
remanufacturability, we made the following assumptions. 
Assumptions 1: The closed loop supply chain decisions are considered in a single 
period (steady-state) setting.  
The planning horizon is a single period representing the effective operation period of 
the remanufacturing technology. Savaskan et al. (2004) assume the previous existence of the 
product in the market. Those products sold in the previous periods can be returned to the 
manufacturer for reuse. The price p , wholesale price w , and remanufacturability R  in our 
model are all decided at the start of the single period and are held constant thereafter.  
Assumption 2: No difference between the quality of the manufactured and 
remanufactured products.  
The example of this assumption depends on the nature of the product. For instance, 
the assumption is reasonable for single use cameras or copy machines that are 
remanufactured to extremely high standards. 
Assumption 3: Producing a new product by using a used product is less costly than 
manufacturing a new one.  
m
c  is the manufacturing cost dollars per new product while 
r
c  is the remanufacturing 
cost per remanufactured product. Given that production cost savings ∆ , the difference from 
manufacturing cost to remanufacturing cost, is the primary economic motive for 
remanufacturing, we assume that the remanufacturing cost is lesser than manufacturing cost 
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per product by a fixed amount ∆  (
m r
c c∆ = − ).  From this assumption, the average unit cost 
of manufacturing is (1 )
m r
c c R c Rτ τ= − + . It can be rewritten as 
m
c c Rτ= − ∆ . 
Assumption 4: We assume that the optimal remanufacturability *R  in our model 
satisfies *0 1R≤ ≤  and the optimal demands and the profits are greater than zero.  
We also assume that the manufacturer can increase the remanufacturability R  by 
investing ( )I R  in improved used product testing and remanufacturing process technologies. It 
is assumed that ( )I R  is convex and increasing function of R  implying that increasing 
investments are required to obtain a fixed increment in remanufacturability. This assumption 
is reasonable because, in practice extremely high investments will be required if every 
returned product is to be remanufactured. In our model, we will use a specific quadratic 
investment function 2( )I R kR= . The scaling parameter k  defined in the remanufacturability 
cost function is assumed to be sufficiently large, such that * 1R ≤ . The use of specific 
functional form enables us to gain some insights and perform sensitivity analysis. The 
quadratic investment function is often used to represent and investment with diminishing 
results in closed form expressions for most optimal quantities (Savaskan and Wassenhove 
2006).  
Assumption 5: The manufacturer has sufficient channel power over the retailer to act 
as a Stackelberg leader.  
The manufacturer uses his foresight about the retailer’s reaction function in his 
decision making. The Stackelberg structure for the solution of similar games has been widely 
used in the supply chain literature (Savaskan et al. 2004, Dowrick 1986). 
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Assumption 6: Both the manufacturer and the retailer have access to the supply chain 
information consisting of the manufacturing cost 
m
c , remanufacturing cost 
r
c , demand 
function q  and collection rate τ .  
3.2  Derivation of MR Model  
We consider the MR model that the manufacturer collects the used products directly 
from consumers. For instance, Xerox Corporation provides prepaid mailboxes so that 
consumers can easily return their used copy or print cartridge to Xerox. The green 
remanufacturing program saves the company 40%-65% in manufacturing costs through reuse 
of parts and materials (Ginsburg 2001). In this model, manufacturer collects the used 
products and then remanufactures them. We set up the closed loop supply chain as a 
Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is leader and makes his decisions first while the 
retailer is the follower makes her decisions later.  
Being the leader, the manufacturer anticipates the retailer’s reaction function and 
determines the optimal remanufacturability R  and wholesale price w  that maximize his 
profit. To solve the Stackelberg game, we first optimize the retailer’s profit MRRpi  and 
determine her reaction function ( )p w  to a given w . The retailer’s profit maximization given 
the wholesale price w  is formulated by (3.1).  
( )( )MRR
p
p w pMaxpi β γ= − −      (3.1) 
In the Stackelberg game, the manufacturer takes the retailer’s reaction function into 
consideration for his price decision. The concavity of the follower’s objective implies that 
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her response function is single valued and is a sufficient condition for the existence of the 
Stackelberg equilibrium.  
From (3.1), 
2
2 2
MR
R
p
pi γ∂ = −
∂
     (3.2) 
2
2 2 0
MR
R
p
pi γ∂ = − <
∂
. Therefore MRRpi  is a concave function of the price w  implying that 
the retailer’s best response function is single valued.  
The retailer’s reaction function given wholesale price w  can be derived from the first 
order necessary condition of (3.1). 
( ) 0
MR
R p p w
p
pi β γ γ∂ = − − − =
∂
    (3.3) 
Solving (3.3), the retailer’s best response function ( )p w  is as provided by (3.4). 
( )
2
wp w β γ
γ
+
=      (3.4) 
The next step in solving the Stackelberg game is to determine the wholesale price w  
and the remanufacturability R  that maximize the manufacturer’s profit MRMpi  while 
considering the retailer’s best response function ( )p w . The manufacturer’s profit 
maximization problem is formulated by (3.5). The mc  is manufacturing cost for new 
products, Rτ∆  is cost savings per remanufactured product after collection, cc τ  is collection 
cost per collected product, and 2kR  is quadratic investment cost for remanufacturing.  
2
,
( )( ( ))MRM m c
w R
w c R c p w kRMaxpi τ τ β γ= − + ∆ − − −    (3.5) 
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After substituting the retailer’s best response function ( )p w  from (3.4) into (3.5), the 
equilibrium price w  and remanufacturability R  are found by equating the first derivatives of 
the manufacturer’s profit (3.6) and (3.7) to zero. 
1 1( ) ( )
2 2
MR
M
c mwr w R c c
w
pi β γ τ τ∂ = − − + ∆ − −
∂
   (3.6) 
1 ( ) 2
2
MR
M w Rk
R
pi β γ τ∂ = − ∆ −
∂
      (3.7) 
We can check if the first order necessary condition satisfying point is optimal by 
checking the second order sufficient condition evaluated at such a point, that, is checking the 
Hessian matrix of MRMpi . 
The Hessian matrix is  
2 2
2
2 2
2
1
11 12 2
21 22 1 2
2
MR MR
M M
MR MR
M M
h h w w RH
h h k
R w R
pi pi γ γ τ
pi pi γ τ
 ∂ ∂  
− − ∆     ∂ ∂ ∂ = = =    ∂ ∂    
− ∆ −    ∂ ∂ ∂ 
  (3.8) 
To meet the second order sufficient condition, we should have 
11 0h γ= − <      (3.9) 
which is true. 
Also, to meet the second order sufficient condition, we should have 
11* 22 12* 21 0h h h h− > , ie., 
2 2111* 22 12* 21 2 (
8
h h h h kγ γτ − = − ∆ 
 
    (3.10) 
In order to satisfy the second order sufficient condition for a maximum, we assume 
that (3.11) is true. 
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2 21
8
k γτ> ∆      (3.11) 
The optimal w  and  R  can be found by solving the first order condition (3.6) and 
(3.7) as shown in (3.12) and (3.13).  
2 2
2 2
4( )
( 8 )
c mc c kw
k
βγ τ β γτ γ
γ γ τ
∆ − + +
=
∆ −
    (3.12) 
2 2
( )
8
c mc cR
k
τ β γτ γ
γ τ
∆ − −
=
− ∆
     (3.13) 
We can get the equilibrium for optimal p  by substituting (3.12) into (3.4). 
2 2
2 2
2(3 )
( 8 )
c mc c kp
k
βγ τ β γτ γ
γ γ τ
∆ − + +
=
∆ −
    (3.15) 
Finally we can obtain the optimal demand q , remanufacturer’s profit  MRRpi , and 
manufacturer’s profit MRMpi  by using optimal w , R , and p . The equilibrium solutions in MR 
model are summarized in Table 1.  
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Table 1. The optimal equilibriums of MR model  
*MRR  2 2
( )
8
c mc c
k
τ β γτ γ
γ τ
∆ − −
− ∆
 
*MRw  
2 2
2 2
4( )
( 8 )
c mc c k
k
βγ τ β γτ γ
γ γ τ
∆ − + +
∆ −
 
*MRp  
2 2
2 2
2(3 )
( 8 )
c mc c k
k
βγ τ β γτ γ
γ γ τ
∆ − + +
∆ −
 
*MRq  2 2
2( ( ))
8
c mc c k
k
β γ τ
γ τ
− +
− ∆
 
*MR
Rpi  ( )
2 2
22 2
4( ( ))
8
c mc c k
k
β γ τ
γ γ τ
− +
− ∆
 
*MR
Mpi  ( )
2
2 2
( ( ))
8
c mc c k
k
β γ τ
γ γ τ
− +
− ∆
 
*MR
Cpi  ( )
2 2 2
22 2
4( ( )) (12 )
8
c mc c k k
k
β γ τ γ τ
γ γ τ
− + − ∆
− ∆
 
3.3  The Centrally Coordinated Model (CC) 
In the previous section, we discussed MR model such as manufacturer-retailer closed 
loop supply chain. In this section, we assume that the manufacturer and the retailer are 
centrally coordinated by a central planner with the objective of maximizing total supply 
chain profit. It is obvious that in a decentralized decision-making environment which is 
addressed as MR model in our thesis, the equilibrium outcome will not be optimal from a 
system’s perspective (Debo et al. 2002). Some degree of coordination is necessary in order to 
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align the incentives of the individual decision makers with the objective to achieve greater 
efficiency from the point of view of the overall supply chain.  
The CC model is illustrated in Figure 2. The CC model has only one player as 
monopoly model: the central planner who manufactures as well as remanufactures the 
products and then sells the products to the consumers. The central planner charges a price p  
per unit to consumers so that the central planner’s demand function is same as the retailer’s 
demand function in MR model. Also, the central planner considers the remanufacturability 
R  that can be economically remanufactured after collection of the used products from 
consumers.  
 
Figure 2.  Illustration of Centrally Coordinated Model 
The CC model provides a benchmark scenario to compare the MR model with respect 
to the supply chain profits and the reverse channel performance such as remanufacturability 
R . 
Forward flow 
Reverse flow 
Central Planner 
 
qτ
CC Model  
Manufacturer 
Consumers 
p
q pβ γ= −
Decides 
,p R
Retailer 
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The central planner’s profit maximization is formulated by (3.16).  
2
,
( )( )CCC m c
p R
p c R c p kRMaxpi τ τ β γ= − + ∆ − − −    (3.16) 
The optimal p  and R  in the central planner can be derived from the first order 
necessary conditions of (3.16). 
( ) 0
CC
C
c mp p R c cp
pi β γ γ τ τ∂ = − − + ∆ − − =
∂
    (3.17) 
( ) 2 0
CC
C p Rk
R
pi β γ τ∂ = − ∆ − =
∂
     (3.18) 
We can also check if the first order necessary condition in CC model satisfying point 
is optimal by checking the second order sufficient condition evaluated at such a point that, is 
checking the Hessian matrix of CCCpi . 
The Hessian matrix is  
2 2
2
2 2
2
11 12 2
21 22 2
CC CC
C C
CC CC
C C
h h p p R
H
h h k
R p R
pi pi
γ γτ
γτpi pi
 ∂ ∂
 
− − ∆∂ ∂ ∂    
= = =    
− ∆ −∂ ∂   
 ∂ ∂ ∂ 
  (3.19) 
To meet the second order sufficient condition, we should have 
11 2 0h γ= − <      (3.20) 
which is true. 
Also, to meet the second order sufficient condition, we should have 
11* 22 12* 21 0h h h h− > , i.e., 
2 2111* 22 12* 21 4 ( )
4
h h h h kγ γτ − = − ∆ 
 
    (3.21) 
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In order to satisfy the second order sufficient condition for a maximum, we assume 
that (3.22) is true. 
2 21
4
k γτ> ∆      (3.22) 
The optimal p  and  R  can be found by solving the first order condition (3.17) and 
(3.18) as shown in (3.23) and (3.24).  
2 2
2 2
2( )
( 4 )
c mc c kp
k
βγ τ β γτ γ
γ γ τ
∆ − + +
=
∆ −
    (3.23) 
2 2
( )
4
c mc cR
k
τ β γτ γ
γ τ
∆ − −
=
− ∆
     (3.24) 
Finally we can obtain the optimal demand q  and central planner’s profit CCCpi  by 
using optimal p  and R . The equilibrium solutions in CC model are summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2.  The optimal equilibriums of CC model 
*CCR  2 2
( )
4
c mc c
k
τ β γτ γ
γ τ
∆ − −
− ∆
 
*CCp  
2 2
2 2
2( )
( 4 )
c mc c k
k
βγ τ β γτ γ
γ γ τ
∆ − + +
∆ −
 
*CCq  2 2
2( ( ))
4
c mc c k
k
β γ τ
γ τ
− +
− ∆
 
*CC
Cpi  ( )
2
22 2
( ( ))
4
c mc c k
k
β γ τ
γ γ τ
− +
− ∆
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3.4  Comparison of MR and CC Model  
One of our research objectives is to investigate how the supply chain competition and 
coordination between manufacturer and retailer impact on the remanufacturability, prices, 
and profits. In this section, we compare the equilibrium solutions of MR model with the 
equilibrium solutions of CC model.  
3.4.1 Comparison of Remanufacturability 
In this section, we will show how the closed loop supply chain can increase the 
remanufacturability by coordinating the manufacturer and the retailer. The 
remanufacturability R  in our model is important to the manufacturer, retailer, and central 
planner because it may increase their profits due to the cost savings. We will compare *MRR  
with *CCR . 
The optimal remanufacturability in MR and CC model are summarized in Table 3.  
Table 3.  The optimal remanufacturability in MR and CC model 
*MRR  2 2
( )
8
c mc c
k
τ β γτ γ
γ τ
∆ − −
− ∆
 
*CCR  2 2
( )
4
c mc c
k
τ β γτ γ
γ τ
∆ − −
− ∆
 
The difference of optimal remanufacturability from MR to CC is shown in (3.25) 
* *
2 2 2 2
4 ( )
(8 )(4 )
MR CC c mc c kR R
k k
τ β γτ γ
γ τ γ τ
 ∆ − −
− = − 
− ∆ − ∆ 
    (3.25) 
We assumed that the scaling parameter k  is sufficiently large, such that * 1R ≤  so 
that the denominator 2 2 2 2(8 )(4 )k kγ τ γ τ− ∆ − ∆  in (3.25) is always greater than zero. If  
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( )c mc cβ γ τ> + , then * * 0MR CCR R− < . Under this condition ( ( )c mc cβ γ τ> + ), the 
remanufacturability in CC model is always greater than the remanufacturability in MR 
model. In other words, we can increase the remanufacturability R  by coordinating a 
manufacturer and a retailer.  
3.4.2 Comparison of Price 
In this section, we will show how the CC model impacts on the price by comparing 
each optimal price. We will compare *MRp  with *CCp . 
The optimal price in MR and CC model are summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4.  The optimal price in MR and CC model 
*MRp  
2 2
2 2
2(3 )
( 8 )
c mc c k
k
βγ τ β γτ γ
γ γ τ
∆ − + +
∆ −
 
*CCp  2 2
2( ( ))
4
c mc c k
k
β γ τ
γ τ
− +
− ∆
 
The difference of optimal price from MR to CC is shown in (3.26) 
2
* *
2 2 2 2
8( )
(8 )(4 )
MR CC c mc c kp p
k k
β γτ γ
γ γ τ γ τ
 − −
− =  
− ∆ − ∆ 
    (3.26) 
The denominator 2 2 2 2(8 )(4 )k kγ γ τ γ τ− ∆ − ∆  in (3.26) is also greater than zero. If  
( )c mc cβ γ τ> + , then * * 0MR CCp p− > . Under this condition ( ( )c mc cβ γ τ> + ), the price in 
MR model is always greater than the price in CC model. In other words, we can reduce the 
retail price p  by coordinating a manufacturer and a retailer so that the consumers’ demand 
will be increased.  
  
 
23
3.4.3 Comparison of Demand 
In this section, we will check if the demand of CC model is greater than the demand 
of MR model. We showed that the retail price p  in CC model is less than the retail price in 
MR model. It leads to the increased demand quantities in CC model by the linear demand 
function ( q pβ γ= − ). We will compare *MRq  with *CCq . 
The optimal demand in MR and CC model are summarized in Table 5.  
Table 5.  The optimal demand in MR and CC model 
*MRq  2 2
2( ( ))
8
c mc c k
k
β γ τ
γ τ
− +
− ∆
 
*CCq  2 2
2( ( ))
4
c mc c k
k
β γ τ
γ τ
− +
− ∆
 
The difference of optimal demand from MR to CC is shown in (3.27) 
2
* *
2 2 2 2
8( )
(8 )(4 )
MR CC c mc c kq q
k k
β γτ γ
γ τ γ τ
 − −
− = − 
− ∆ − ∆ 
   (3.27) 
The denominator 2 2 2 2(8 )(4 )k kγ τ γ τ− ∆ − ∆  in (3.27) is also greater than zero. If  
( )c mc cβ γ τ> + , then * * 0MR CCq q− < . Under this condition ( ( )c mc cβ γ τ> + ), the demand in 
CC model is always greater than the demand in MR model. In other words, we can increase 
the consumers’ demand q  by coordinating a manufacturer and a retailer.  
3.4.4 Comparison of Channel Profit 
The CC model provides a benchmark scenario to compare the MR model with respect 
to the closed loop supply chain profits. The benefits to the centrally coordinated model, in 
terms of an increased remanufacturability as well as an increased ability to buy the product 
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(greater demand) will lead to the higher profit for CC model. We will compare *MRCpi  with 
*CC
Cpi . 
The optimal channel profit in MR and CC model are summarized in Table 6.  
Table 6.  The optimal channel profit in MR and CC model 
*MR
Cpi  ( )
2 2 2
22 2
4( ( )) (12 )
8
c mc c k k
k
β γ τ γ τ
γ γ τ
− + − ∆
− ∆
 
*CC
Cpi  ( )
2
22 2
( ( ))
4
c mc c k
k
β γ τ
γ γ τ
− +
− ∆
 
The difference of optimal channel profit from MR to CC is shown in (3.28) 
2 3
* *
2 2 2 2 2
16( )
( 8 ) ( 4 )
MR CC c m
C C
c c k
k k
β γτ γ
pi pi
γ γ τ γ τ
 − −
− =  ∆ − ∆ − 
    (3.28) 
The numerator 2 316( )c mc c kβ γτ γ− −  in (3.28) is greater than zero if k  is positive. 
The denominator 2 2 2 2 2( 8 ) ( 4 )k kγ γ τ γ τ∆ − ∆ −  is less than zero because k  was assumed to be 
sufficiently large so that * * 0MR CCC Cpi pi− < . Thus, the profit in CC model is always greater than 
the profit in MR model.  
In conclusion, we can increase the remanufacturability as well as the channel profit 
by coordinating a manufacturer and a retailer. Furthermore the decreased retail price in CC 
model encourages consumers to buy more products.  
3.5  Numerical Examples 
We now provide numerical examples to illustrate the analytical insights and make 
further observations comparing MR and CC model equilibriums. This numerical example 
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was performed to determine the effects that key parameters had on the equilibrium of 
remanufacturability, wholesale price, retail price, and profits. The parameters, which include 
cost savings ∆  and collection rate τ , lead the discussion for the analysis of MR and CC 
model. The examples used for the sensitive analysis are shown in Appendix D. The example 
data are: 
1000β = , 5γ = , $10 / product∆ = , 0.5τ = , $2 /cc product= , $20 /mc product= , 
and $2000k = . 
3.5.1 Variation with Cost Savings ( ∆ ) 
In this section, the cost savings ∆  in MR and CC model was varied from 5 to 15 
while all other parameters were held constant. The remanufacturability of MR and CC model 
are shown in Figure 3 when the cost savings ∆  increases from 5 to 15.  
Remanufacturability
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
MR model
CC model
 
Figure 3.  Remanufacturability with variation of ∆  
From Figure 3, we can observe that R  is increasing with ∆  in both MR and CC 
model. In addition, the difference between the remanufacturability of the MR and CC model 
is the greatest when ∆  is large. This observation can be expected from (3.25): the difference 
between *MRR  and *CCR  becomes a larger as ∆  increases.  
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Retail Price
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Figure 4.  Retail price with variation of ∆  
Demand
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
MR model
CC model
 
Figure 5.  Demand with variation of ∆  
Figure 4 and 5 show the retail price and demand with variation of ∆  in MR and CC 
model. We can see the retail price in MR model is always greater than the retail price in CC 
model so that it leads to the higher demand in CC model than the demand in MR model. 
Also, the retail price in both MR and CC model decreases as ∆  increases. From (3.26), the 
difference between *MRp  and *CCp  becomes a larger as ∆  increases.  
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Retailer Profit
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Figure 6.  Retailer profit with variation of ∆  
Manufacturer Profit
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20200
20300
20400
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Figure 7.  Manufacturer profit with variation of ∆  
Channel Profit
30000
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36000
38000
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5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
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CC model
 
Figure 8.  Channel profit with variation of ∆  
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Figure 6, 7, and 8 show the retailer, manufacturer, and total channel profit with 
variation of ∆  in MR and CC model. We can observe that the profit of both the retailer and 
manufacturer is nonlinearly increasing with ∆ . It implies that the additional cost savings in 
∆  would be profitable for both the manufacturer and retailer to a more number of products 
resulting in a more incentive to increase the remanufacturability. Moreover, we can observe 
that the total channel profit (the central planner profit) in CC model is always greater than the 
total channel profit (the manufacturer and retailer profit) in MR model. This observation can 
be also expected from (3.28): the difference between *MRCpi  and *CCCpi  becomes a larger as ∆  
increases. 
As we have observed through this numerical example (variation of ∆ ): 
1) The remanufacturability increases as cost savings increases. 
2) We can increase the remanufacturability as well as the total channel profit by 
coordinating the manufacturer and the retailer.  
3.5.2 Variation with Collection Cost (τ ) 
In previous section, we varied the cost savings ∆  from 5 to 15. From this section, we 
investigate how the collection rate τ  impacts on the remanufacturability, retail price, and 
profits. Now we vary the collection rate τ   from 0 to 1 when the cost savings ∆  is fixed at 
10 in both MR and CC model. The remanufacturability of MR and CC model are shown in 
Figure 9 when the collection cost τ  increases from 0 to 1.  
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Remanufacturability
0.0
0.2
0.4
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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Figure 9.  Remanufacturability with variation of τ  
From Figure 9, we can observe that R  is increasing with τ  in both MR and CC 
model. In addition, the difference between the remanufacturabilities of the MR and CC 
model is the greatest when τ  is the largest (= 1.0).  
Retail Price
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Figure 10.  Retail price with variation of τ  
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Demand
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Figure 11.  Demand with variation of τ  
Figure 10 and 11 show the retail price and demand with variation of τ  in MR and CC 
model. We can see the retail price in MR model is always greater than the retail price in CC 
model so that it leads to the higher demand in CC model than the demand in MR model. 
Also, the retail price in both MR and CC model decreases as τ  increases. When τ  is a 
maximum (τ =1.0), the retail price is a minimum and the demand is a maximum in both 
models (See the tables in Appendix D).  
Retailer Profit
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Figure 12.  Retailer profit with variation of τ  
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Manufacturer Profit
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Figure 13.  Manufacturer profit with variation of τ  
Channel Profit
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Figure 14.  Channel profit with variation of τ  
Figure 12, 13, and 14 show the retailer, manufacturer, and total channel profit with 
variation of τ  in MR and CC model. From Figure 12 to 14, the profit of the retailer, 
manufacturer, and central planner is a maximum when the collection rate τ  is one. However, 
the profit curve is convex when τ  varies 0 to 1. 
Now we consider when k (scaling parameter, 2( )I R kR= ) is 1000 and 2000 in Figure 
15. The manufacturer’s profit when 1000k =  is greater than the profit when 2000k =  
because he can reduce the investment cost for remanufacturability. Also, we can see when τ  
is small ( 0 0.354τ< < ) and 1000k = , the manufacturer’s profit with remanufacturing is 
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lower than the profit without remanufacturing because the total collection cost ( cc qτ ) and 
remanufacturability investment cost ( 2kR ) is higher than the total cost savings from 
remanufacturing ( R qτ∆ ).  
Manufacturer Profit
20100
20200
20300
20400
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
k=1000
k=2000
 
Figure 15.  Manufacturer’s profit by τ  and k  
When 0τ = , there is no remanufacturing. When 1000k =  and 0 0.354τ< < , without 
remanufacturing is more profitable than with remanufacturing. When 1000k =  and 
0.345 1τ< ≤ , with remanufacturing is more profitable than without remanufacturing. In 
order that the remanufacturing is profitable, 2( )cR q c q kRτ τ∆ > + .  
Table 7.  Manufacturer’s profit when 1000k =  
 β   γ   cc   mc  ∆   k   τ   R   w   p   q   MRMpi   2cc q kRτ +    R qτ∆  
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0 0.00 110.0 155.0 225.0 20250.0 0.0 0.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.05 0.06 110.0 155.0 224.9 20230.7 25.7 6.3 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.1 0.11 110.0 155.0 224.9 20217.7 57.6 25.3 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.15 0.17 110.0 155.0 224.9 20211.0 95.9 56.9 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.2 0.23 110.0 155.0 225.1 20210.6 140.7 101.3 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.25 0.28 109.9 154.9 225.3 20216.6 191.9 158.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.3 0.34 109.8 154.9 225.5 20229.0 249.7 228.9 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.354 0.40 109.6 154.8 225.9 20249.6 319.8 319.7 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.4 0.45 109.5 154.7 226.3 20273.1 385.8 409.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.45 0.51 109.3 154.7 226.7 20305.0 464.3 520.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 1000 0.5 0.57 109.1 154.5 227.3 20343.5 550.2 645.8 
As we have observed through this numerical example (variation of τ ): 
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1) The remanufacturability increases as collection rate increases. 
2) When the collection rate is one, the retailer and manufacturer’s profit is a 
maximum. 
3) Under the condition 2( )cR q c q kRτ τ∆ > + , the remanufacturing is profitable. 
Otherwise, manufacturer will lose money by introducing remanufacturing 
activities.  
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CHAPTER 4.  MANUFACTURER-RETAILER WITH GOVERNMENT 
MODEL (MRG) 
In the previous chapter, we formulated and analyzed the manufacturer-retailer (MR) 
model that the manufacturer considers his remanufacturability. In this chapter, we will 
introduce the government penalty and subsidy system based on the MR model. This MRG 
(Manufacturer-Retailer with Government) model will show the impact of the subsidy and 
penalty system of government to the members (manufacturer and retailer) of the closed loop 
supply chain that are involved.  
The subsidy fee will cover costs of recycling and/or reuse, transportation of product 
from first point of collection, and a reasonable, limited collection incentive payment to 
encourage collection by a variety of entities, including retailers, municipalities, non-profits, 
etc (Jackson 2003). In reality, due to the increasing consciousness on environmental 
sustainability, legislative pressure like ARF (Advanced Recovery Fee) requires consumers to 
pay at the point of retail purchase a recovery fee for recycling or remanufacturing. Also, the 
local government has policies to increase consumer’s used products to be recycled, reused, or 
refurbished. To date, 12 states have enacted some form of e-waste management law (as many 
as 20 states proposed e-waste laws in 2006 and 2007). Most state laws and proposals have 
certain broad elements in common, such as specifying the electronic devices covered under 
the law; how a collection and recycling and/or remanufacturing program will be financed; 
collection and recycling criteria that must be met to minimize the impact to human health and 
the environment; and restrictions or requirements that products must meet to be sold in the 
state. For example, the e-waste legislation in State of Oregon requires retailers to charge first 
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in-state buyers of electronic devices an ARF of up to $10 to pay for remanufacturing of 
products (INFORM 2007). 
In this chapter, we will consider the ARF (Advanced Recovery Fee) system as 
environmental fee in our model. The retailer collects the fee at the point of retail purchase 
and remits the fee into the government. The ARF in this chapter is defined as the government 
collects the fee from consumers to subsidize manufacturer’s remanufacturing of the collected 
products.  
 The objective of our research in this chapter is to investigate into following 
questions: 
1) How the government collects the ARF from consumers and distributes it for 
remanufacturing? 
2) How the government’s penalty to consumers (ARF) and subsidy for remanufacturing 
to the manufacturer impact on the remanufacturability and profits? 
3) How supply chain competition and coordination between manufacturer and retailer 
with government impacts on the remanufacturability, prices, and profits? 
In order to answer these questions, we establish a closed-loop supply chain with the 
government penalty to consumers and subsidy for remanufacturing to the manufacturer. 
4.1  Model Assumptions and Notations 
In this chapter, we formulate and analyze the manufacturer-retailer with government 
subsidy and penalty model (MRG) that the government collects the fee (ARF) as 
environmental fee from consumers and subsidizes it for remanufacturing. The MRG model is 
illustrated in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16.  Illustration of Manufacturer-Retailer with Government Model 
We formulate this MRG model as a Stackelberg game with the manufacturer as the 
leader and the retailer as the follower. The key assumptions and notations in this model are 
the same as those in the MR model in chapter 3. However in order to consider the 
government penalty and subsidy system, we use additional notations and assumptions for the 
government. Additional notations used in this chapter are explained below: 
α : ARF (Advanced Recovery Fee), the retailer collects the fee from consumers at the point 
of retail purchases (dollars per product) and remits it to the government; 
η : The subsidy for remanufacturing, the government subsidizes the fee collected from the 
consumers into the manufacturer for remanufacturing (dollars per remanufactured product).   
Np α+ : The price that the consumers pay after the government’s penalty and subsidy; 
Np : The new retail price after the government’s penalty and subsidy, the retailer receives Np ; 
Nq : The consumer demand function after the government’s penalty and subsidy, 
( ( )N Nq pβ γ α= − + ); 
MRG
Rpi : The retailer’s profit in MRG model; 
MRG Model 
Manufacturer 
ARF 
Subsidy for 
remanufacturing 
Retailer 
Consumers 
Government 
Forward flow 
Reverse flow 
Consumer penalty 
Remanufacturing 
subsidy 
η
α
w
Np α+
( )N Nq pβ γ α= − +
Nqτ
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MRG
Mpi : The manufacturer’s profit in MRG model; 
MRG
Cpi : The total channel profit in MRG model ( MRG MRG MRGC R Mpi pi pi= + ); 
CCG
Cpi : The centrally coordinated planner’s profit in CCG model; 
In order to model the closed loop supply chain with the government subsidy for 
remanufacturing, we made the following additional assumptions. 
Assumption 7: The total collected fee (ARF) is balanced with the total 
remanufacturing subsidy in this model. It means the government revenue neutrality through 
the penalty and subsidy system. 
The fee collected from the consumers will be used to increase the remanufacturability 
in this model. The government collects ARF from the consumers as Nqα and pays it to the 
manufacturer for remanufacturing as NR qη τ . We assume that the government has a policy 
that the total amount of ARF is balanced with the total amount of subsidy. It means that the 
amount of the fee collected from the consumers is equal to the amount of subsidy for 
remanufacturing. This assumption is shown in (4.1).  However, we assume that the retailer 
and manufacturer do not know this government policy. If this policy is opened to the 
manufacturer, the subsidy will not impact on his remanufacturability because he knows that 
the fee collected from the consumers is his profit before setting up the remanufacturability. 
N Nq R qα η τ=       (4.1) 
Assumption 8: The demand shift is caused by ARF. 
The original demand function without ARF consideration is q pβ γ= −  in MR 
model. It presents a downward sloping linear demand function. It is shown that the vertical 
interaction between the channel members and the optimality of the channel strategies depend 
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on the convexity of the demand function (Lee and Staelin 1997). The demand shift caused by 
the ARF is shown in (4.2).  
( )N Nq pβ γ α= − +      (4.2) 
The derivation of the demand shift caused by the ARF is given in the Appendix A. 
4.2  Derivation of MRG Model 
In the manufacturer-retailer with government intervention model (MRG), the 
government collects ARF from consumers and subsidizes it to the manufacturer for 
remanufacturing. Based on this environmental fee consideration, we set up the closed-loop 
supply chain as a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is leader and makes his decisions 
first while the retailer is the follower makes her decisions later.  
Being the leader, the manufacturer anticipates the retailer’s reaction function and 
determines the optimal wholesale price that maximizes his profit. To solve the Stackelberg 
game, we first optimize the retailer’s profit MRGRpi  and determine her reaction function ( )Np w  
to a given w . The retailer’s profit maximization given the wholesale price w  is formulated by 
(4.3).  
( )( ( ))
N
MRG
R N N
p
p w pMaxpi β γ α= − − +     (4.3) 
In the Stackelberg game, the manufacturer takes the retailer’s reaction function into 
consideration for his price decision. The concavity of the follower’s objective implies that 
her response function is single valued and is a sufficient condition for the existence of the 
Stackelberg equilibrium.  
From (4.3), 
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2
2 2
MRG
R
Np
pi γ∂ = −
∂
    (4.4) 
2
2 2 0
MRG
R
Np
pi γ∂ = − <
∂
. Therefore MRGRpi is a concave function of the price w  implying 
that the retailer’s best response function is single valued. 
The retailer’s reaction function given wholesale price w  can be derived from the first 
order necessary conditions of (4.3). 
( ) ( ) 0
MRG
R
N N
N
p w p
p
pi β γ α γ∂ = − − − + =
∂
   (4.5) 
Solving (4.5), the retailer’s best response function ( )Np w  is as provided by (4.6). 
( )( )
2N
wp w β α γ
γ
+ −
=      (4.6) 
The next step in solving the Stackelberg game is to determine the wholesale price w  
and the remanufacturability R  that maximize the manufacturer’s profit MRGMpi  while 
considering the retailer’s best response function ( )Np w . The manufacturer’s profit 
maximization problem is formulated by (4.7). The ( (( ) ))NR p wη τ β γ α− +  is the government 
subsidy to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. 
,
2( )( ( ( ) )) ( ( ( ) ))
MRG
M
w R
m c N N
Max
w c R c p w kR R p w
pi
τ τ β γ α η τ β γ α
=
− + ∆ − − + − + − +
  (4.7) 
After substituting the retailer’s best response function ( )Np w  from (4.6) into (4.7), 
the equilibrium price w  and remanufacturability R  are found by equating the first 
derivatives of the manufacturer’s profit (4.8) and (4.9) to zero. 
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1 ( (2 ( ) ) )
2
MRG
M
c mw R c c
w
pi β γ α η τ γτ γ∂ = − + + ∆ + + +
∂
   (4.8) 
1 (( ( ) )( ) 4 )
2
MRG
M w Rk
R
pi β α γ η τ∂ = − + ∆ + −
∂
     (4.9) 
We can check if the first order necessary condition satisfying point is optimal by 
checking the second order sufficient condition evaluated at such a point, that is checking the 
Hessian matrix of MRGMpi . 
The Hessian matrix is  
2 2
2
2 2
2
1 ( )11 12 2
21 22 1 ( ) 2
2
MRG MRG
M M
MRG MRG
M M
h h w w RH
h h k
R w R
pi pi γ γτ η
pi pi γτ η
 ∂ ∂  
− − ∆ +     ∂ ∂ ∂ = = =    ∂ ∂    
− ∆ + −    ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 (4.10) 
To meet the second order sufficient condition, we should have 
11 0h γ= − <      (4.11) 
which is true. 
Also, to meet the second order sufficient condition, we should have 
11* 22 12* 21 0h h h h− > , i.e., 
2 2111* 22 12* 21 2 ( ( )
8
h h h h kγ γτ η − = − ∆ + 
 
   (4.12) 
In order to satisfy the second order sufficient condition for a maximum, we assume 
that (4.13) is true. 
2 21 ( )
8
k γτ η> ∆ +     (4.13) 
The optimal w  and  R  can be found by solving the first order condition (4.8) and 
(4.9) as shown in (4.14) and (4.15).  
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2 2
2 2
( )( ) 4( )
( ( ) 8 )
c mc c kw
k
γ β αγ η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ γ η τ
− ∆ + − − + +
=
∆ + −
   (4.14) 
2 2
( ) ( )
8 ( )
c mc cR
k
η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ η τ
∆ + − − −
=
− ∆ +
     (4.15) 
We can get the equilibrium for optimal Np  by substituting (4.14) into (4.6). 
2 2
2 2
( )( ) 2(3 3 )
( ( ) 8 )
c m
N
c c kp
k
γ β αγ η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ γ η τ
− ∆ + − − + +
=
∆ + −
  (4.16) 
Finally we can obtain the optimal demand Nq , 
MRG
Rpi , and 
MRG
Mpi  by using optimal w , 
R , and Np . The equilibrium solutions in MRG model are summarized in Table 8.  
Table 8.  The optimal equilibriums of MRG model  
*MRGR  2 2
( ) ( )
8 ( )
c mc c
k
η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ η τ
∆ + − − −
− ∆ +
 
*MRGw  
2 2
2 2
( )( ) 4( )
( ( ) 8 )
c mc c k
k
γ β αγ η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ γ η τ
− ∆ + − − + +
∆ + −
 
*MRG
Np  
2 2
2 2
( )( ) 2(3 3 )
( ( ) 8 )
c mc c k
k
γ β αγ η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ γ η τ
− ∆ + − − + +
∆ + −
 
*MRG
Nq  2 2
2( ( ))
8 ( )
c mc c k
k
β αγ γ τ
γ η τ
− − +
− ∆ +
 
*MRG
Rpi  ( )
2 2
22 2
4( ( ))
8 ( )
c mc c k
k
β αγ γ τ
γ γ η τ
− − +
− ∆ +
 
*MRG
Mpi  ( )
2
2 2
( ( ))
8 ( )
c mc c k
k
β αγ γ τ
γ γ η τ
− − +
− ∆ +
 
*MRG
Cpi  ( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (12 ( ) )
8 ( )
c mc c k k
k
β αγ γ τ γ η τ
γ γ η τ
− − + − ∆ +
− ∆ +
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4.3  The Centrally Coordinated with Government Model (CCG) 
In the previous section, we discussed MRG model such as manufacturer-retailer with 
government closed loop supply chain. In this section, we assume that the manufacturer and 
the retailer are centrally coordinated by a central planner with the objective of maximizing 
total supply chain profits. The CCG model is illustrated in Figure 17.  
The central planner charges a price Np  per unit to consumers so that the central 
planner’s demand function is same as the retailer’s demand function in MRG model. Also, 
the central planner considers the remanufacturability R  that can be economically 
remanufactured after collection of the used products from consumers.  
 
Figure 17.  Illustration of Centrally Coordinated with Government Model 
The CCG model provides a benchmark scenario to compare the MRG model with 
respect to the supply chain profits and the reverse channel performance such as 
remanufacturability R . 
The central planner’s profit maximization is formulated by (4.17).  
2
,
( )( ( )) ( ( ))
N
CCG
C N m c N N
p R
p c R c p kR R pMaxpi τ τ β γ α η τ β γ α= − + ∆ − − + − + − +  (4.17) 
CCG Model 
Consumers 
Government 
Forward Flow 
Reverse Flow 
Consumer penalty 
Remanufacturing 
subsidy 
η
α
Np α+
( )N Nq pβ γ α= − +
Manufacturer 
Decides 
,p R
(Central Planner) 
Retailer 
Subsidy for 
remanufacturing 
 
Nqτ
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The optimal Np  and R  in the central planner can be derived from the first order 
necessary conditions of (4.17). 
( ) ( ) 0
CCG
C
N N c m
N
p R p R c c
p
pi β α γ γητ γ τ τ∂ = − + − − + ∆ − − =
∂
  (4.18) 
( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) 2 0
CCG
C
N Np p RkR
pi β α γ τ β α γ ητ∂ = − + ∆ + − + − =
∂
   (4.19) 
We can also check if the first order necessary condition in CCG model satisfying 
point is optimal by checking the second order sufficient condition evaluated at such a point 
that, is checking the Hessian matrix of CCGCpi . 
The Hessian matrix is  
2 2
2
2 2
2
11 12 2 ( )
21 22 ( ) 2
CCG CCG
C C
N N
CCG CCG
C C
N
p p Rh h
H
h h k
R p R
pi pi
γ γτ η
γτ ηpi pi
 ∂ ∂
 ∂ ∂ ∂ − − ∆ +    
= = =    
− ∆ + −∂ ∂   
 ∂ ∂ ∂  
 (4.20) 
To meet the second order sufficient condition, we should have 
11 2 0h γ= − <      (4.21) 
which is true. 
Also, to meet the second order sufficient condition, we should have 
11* 22 12* 21 0h h h h− > , ie., 
2 2111* 22 12* 21 4 ( ( )
4
h h h h kγ γτ η − = − ∆ + 
 
   (4.22) 
In order to satisfy the second order sufficient condition for a maximum, we assume 
that (4.23) is true. 
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2 21 ( )
4
k γτ η> ∆ +     (4.23) 
The optimal Np  and  R  can be found by solving the first order condition (4.18) and 
(4.19) as shown in (4.24) and (4.25).  
2 2
2 2
( )( ) 2( )
( ( ) 4 )
c m
N
c c kp
k
γ β αγ η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ γ η τ
− ∆ + − − + +
=
∆ + −
  (4.24) 
2 2
( ) ( )
4 ( )
c mc cR
k
η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ η τ
∆ + − − −
=
− ∆ +
     (4.25) 
Finally we can obtain the optimal demand Nq  and central planner’s profit 
CCG
Cpi  by 
using optimal Np  and R . The equilibrium solutions in CC model are summarized in Table 9.  
Table 9.  The optimal equilibriums of CCG model 
*CCGR  2 2
( ) ( )
4 ( )
c mc c
k
η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ η τ
∆ + − − −
− ∆ +
 
*CCG
Np  
2 2
2 2
( )( ) 2( )
( ( ) 4 )
c mc c k
k
γ β αγ η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ γ η τ
− ∆ + − − + +
∆ + −
 
*CCG
Nq  2 2
2( ( ))
4 ( )
c mc c k
k
β αγ γ τ
γ η τ
− − +
− ∆ +
 
*CCG
Cpi  ( )
2
2 2
( ( ))
4 ( )
c mc c k
k
β αγ γ τ
γ γ η τ
− − +
− ∆ +
 
4.4  Comparison of MRG and CCG Model  
One of our research objectives is to investigate how the supply chain competition and 
coordination between manufacturer and retailer with government impact on the 
  
 
45
remanufacturability, prices, and profits. In this section, we compare the equilibrium solutions 
of MRG model with the equilibrium solutions of CCG model.  
4.4.1 Comparison of Remanufacturability 
In this section, we will show how the closed loop supply chain with government can 
increase the remanufacturability by coordinating the manufacturer and the retailer. The 
remanufacturability R  in our model is important to the manufacturer, retailer, and central 
planner because it may increase their profits due to the cost savings. We will compare *MRGR  
with *CCGR . 
The optimal remanufacturability in MRG and CCG model are summarized in Table 
10.  
Table 10.  The optimal remanufacturability in MRG and CCG model 
*MRGR  2 2
( ) ( )
8 ( )
c mc c
k
η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ η τ
∆ + − − −
− ∆ +
 
*CCGR  2 2
( ) ( )
4 ( )
c mc c
k
η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ η τ
∆ + − − −
− ∆ +
 
The difference of optimal remanufacturability from MRG to CCG is shown in (4.26). 
* *
2 2 2 2
4( ) ( )
(8 ( ) )(4 ( ) )
MRG CCG c mc c kR R
k k
η τ β γα γτ γ
γ η τ γ η τ
 ∆ + − − −
− = − 
− ∆ + − ∆ + 
   (4.26) 
We assumed that the scaling parameter k  is sufficiently large, such that * 1R ≤  so 
that the denominator 2 2 2 2(8 ( ) )(4 ( ) )k kγ η τ γ η τ− ∆ + − ∆ +  in (4.26) is always greater than 
zero. If  ( )c mc cβ γ α τ> + + , then * * 0MRG CCGR R− < . Under this condition 
( ( )c mc cβ γ α τ> + + ), the remanufacturability in CCG model is always greater than the 
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remanufacturability in MRG model. In other words, we can increase the remanufacturability 
R  by coordinating a manufacturer and a retailer under the government penalty and subsidy 
system.  
4.4.2 Comparison of Price 
In this section, we will show how the CCG model impacts on the price by comparing 
each optimal price. We will compare *MRGNp  with 
*CCG
Np . 
The optimal price in MRG and CCG model are summarized in Table 11.  
Table 11.  The optimal price in MRG and CCG model 
*MRG
Np  
2 2
2 2
( )( ) 2(3 3 )
( ( ) 8 )
c mc c k
k
γ β αγ η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ γ η τ
− ∆ + − − + +
∆ + −
 
*CCG
Np  
2 2
2 2
( )( ) 2( )
( ( ) 4 )
c mc c k
k
γ β αγ η τ β αγ γτ γ
γ γ η τ
− ∆ + − − + +
∆ + −
 
The difference of optimal price from MRG to CCG is shown in (4.27) 
( )
2
* *
2 4 4 2 2
8( )
( ) 4 (8 3 ( ) )
MRG CCG c m
N N
c c k
p p
k k
β γα γτ γ
γ γ η τ γ η τ
 
− − −
 
− =
 ∆ + + − ∆ + 
  (4.27) 
The denominator ( )2 4 4 2 2( ) 4 (8 3 ( ) )k kγ γ η τ γ η τ∆ + + − ∆ +  in (4.27) is also greater 
than zero. If  ( )c mc cβ γ α τ> + + , then * * 0MRG CCGN Np p− > . Under this condition 
( ( )c mc cβ γ α τ> + + ), the price in MRG model is always greater than the price in CCG 
model. In other words, we can reduce the retail price Np  by coordinating a manufacturer and 
a retailer under the government intervention so that the consumers’ demand in CCG will be 
increased.  
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4.4.3 Comparison of Demand 
In this section, we will check if the demand of CCG model is greater than the demand 
of MRG model. We showed that the retail price Np  in CCG model is less than the retail price 
in MRG model. It leads to the increased demand quantities in CCG model by the linear 
demand function ( ( )N Nq pβ γ α= − + ). We will compare *MRGNq  with *CCGNq . 
The optimal demand in MRG and CCG model are summarized in Table 12.  
Table 12.  The optimal demand in MRG and CCG model 
*MRG
Nq  2 2
2( ( ))
8 ( )
c mc c k
k
β αγ γ τ
γ η τ
− − +
− ∆ +
 
*CCG
Nq  2 2
2( ( ))
4 ( )
c mc c k
k
β αγ γ τ
γ η τ
− − +
− ∆ +
 
The difference of optimal demand from MRG to CCG is shown in (4.28) 
2
* *
2 2 2 2
8( )
(8 ( ) )(4 ( ) )
MRG CCG c m
N N
c c kq q
k k
β γα γτ γ
γ η τ γ η τ
 − − −
− = − 
− ∆ + − ∆ + 
  (4.28) 
The denominator 2 2 2 2(8 ( ) )(4 ( ) )k kγ η τ γ η τ− ∆ + − ∆ +  in (4.28) is also greater than 
zero. If  ( )c mc cβ γ α τ> + + , then * * 0MRG CCGN Nq q− < . Under this condition 
( ( )c mc cβ γ α τ> + + ), the demand in CCG model is always greater than the demand in MRG 
model. In other words, we can increase the consumers’ demand Nq  by coordinating a 
manufacturer and a retailer under the government intervention.  
4.4.4 Comparison of Channel Profit 
The CCG model provides a benchmark scenario to compare the MRG model with 
respect to the closed loop supply chain profits. The benefits to the centrally coordinated 
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model, in terms of an increased remanufacturability as well as an increased ability to buy the 
product (greater demand) will lead to the higher profit for CCG model. We will compare 
*MRG
Cpi  with 
*CCG
Cpi . 
The optimal channel profit in MRG and CCG model are summarized in Table 13.  
Table 13.  The optimal channel profit in MRG and CCG model 
*MRG
Cpi  ( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (12 ( ) )
8 ( )
c mc c k k
k
β αγ γ τ γ η τ
γ γ η τ
− − + − ∆ +
− ∆ +
 
*CCG
Cpi  ( )
2
2 2
( ( ))
4 ( )
c mc c k
k
β αγ γ τ
γ γ η τ
− − +
− ∆ +
 
The difference of optimal channel profit from MR to CC is shown in (4.29) 
2 3
* *
2 2 2 2 2
16( )
( ( ) 8 ) ( ( ) 4 )
MRG CCG c m
C C
c c k
k k
β γα γτ γ
pi pi
γ γ η τ γ η τ
 − − −
− =  ∆ + − ∆ + − 
   (4.29) 
The numerator 2 316( )c mc c kβ γα γτ γ− − −  in (4.29) is greater than zero if k  is 
positive. The denominator 2 2 2 2 2( ( ) 8 ) ( ( ) 4 )k kγ γ η τ γ η τ∆ + − ∆ + −  is less than zero because 
k  was assumed to be sufficiently large so that * * 0MRG CCGC Cpi pi− < . Thus, the profit in CCG 
model is always greater than the profit in MRG model.  
In conclusion, we can increase the remanufacturability as well as the channel profit 
by coordinating a manufacturer and a retailer under the government environmental fee 
consideration (the penalty to consumers and the subsidy to the manufacturer for 
remanufacturing). Furthermore the decreased retail price in CCG model encourages 
consumers to buy more products like CC model in the chapter 3.  
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4.5  Numerical Examples 
We will show the numerical examples in both MRG and CCG model to illustrate the 
impact of the government subsidy and penalty system. In this chapter the numerical example 
was performed to determine the effects that key parameter had on equilibrium of 
remanufacturability, wholesale and retail price, and profits. The parameter, which include 
government subsidy for remanufacturing, leads the discussion for the analysis of MRG and 
CCG model. The example data are the same as those in the chapter 3 and the examples used 
for the sensitive analysis are shown in Appendix E.   
4.5.1 Variation with Subsidy (η ) 
The government subsidy η  for remanufacturing in both MRG and CCG model was 
varied 0 to 20 while all other parameters were held constant. Figure 18 shows optimal 
remanufacturability when the government subsidy η  varies. In both MRG and CCG model 
as η  increases, the remanufacturability R  increases because η  has directly influences on the 
remanufacturability so that the manufacturer or the central planner will set up R  as high. 
Thus we can observe that the government may prefer to the higher η  to increase the 
remanufacturability which can be considered as environmental improvement. In addition, the 
difference between the remanufacturability of the MRG and CCG model is the greatest when 
η  is large. We can observe that the difference between *MRGR  and *CCGR  becomes a larger as 
η  increases through Figure 18.  
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Figure 18.  Remanufacturability with variation of η  
Advanced Recovery Fee
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Figure 19.  ARF with variation of η  
From Assumption 7, we assumed the government revenue neutrality through the 
penalty and subsidy system. Figure 19 shows the relationship between η  and α . For 
example, we found that the equilibrium value of R  is 0.86 given to the collection rate 
0.5τ =   in MRG model through the manufacturer profit maximization objective. If the 
government put this value into the government revenue neutrality constraint from (4.1), we 
can find 8.59α =  when 20η = . 
Figure 20 and 21 show wholesale price and retail price when η  varies from 0 to 20 in 
MRG model. We can observe that the wholesale price decreases as η  increases because the 
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government subsidy for remanufacturing affects to the cost savings so that the manufacturer 
can reduce the total cost of manufacturing. The retailer also has decreasing retail price as η  
increases because the increased η  leads to the increased α . We can observe that the retailer 
prefers to reduce the retail price more as α  increases. Also, the Figure 21 shows that the 
difference between *MRGNp  and 
*CCG
Np  becomes a larger as η  increases.  
Wholesale Price
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100.0
110.0
120.0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
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Figure 20.  Wholesale price with variation of η  
Retail Price
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Figure 21.  Retail price with variation of η  
Figure 22 and 23 show the final retail price Np α+  (retailer’s equilibrium price with 
the advanced recovery fee) and the consumers’ demand. It shows interesting results that the 
  
 
52
final price decreases even if the government increases α . The reason is that the retailer or 
the central planner may reduce her price more in order to keep the demand as the penalty to 
the consumer increases. For this reason, the consumer demand is slightly increased.  
Retail Price with ARF
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Figure 22.  Retail price with ARF with variation of η  
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Figure 23.  Demand with variation of η  
Next we can observe that the manufacturer’s profit decreases as η  increases in Figure 
24. This is opposite result in that the government subsidy for remanufacturing to the 
manufacturer has a negative impact on the manufacturer’s profit because the subsidy comes 
from the consumers. The primary reason is the government revenue neutrality. In the aspect 
of manufacturer’s profit we can see that the profit loss by the consumer penalty α  is greater 
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than the profit gain by the remanufacturing subsidy η . In contrast to the manufacturer, we 
can also observe that the profit gain by remanufacturing subsidy is greater than the loss by 
the consumer penalty so that the retailer earns more money.  
We prove that the manufacturer’s profit decreases as the government subsidy 
increases. The manufacturer’s profit in MRG model is shown in (4.30). 
( )
2
2 2
( ( ))
8 ( )
MRG c m
M
c c k
k
β αγ γ τ
pi
γ γ η τ
− − +
=
− ∆ +
    (4.30) 
From (4.1),  
2
2
( ) ( )
8 ( )
c mc c
k
η η τ β γτ γ
α
γ η τ
∆ + − −
=
− ∆ ∆ +
    (4.31) 
By substituting (4.31) into (4.30), we have 
( )
2 2 2
22
( ) (8 ( ) )
( ) 8
MRG c m
M
c c k k
k
β γτ γ γ η τ
pi
γ γ η τ
− − − ∆ +
=
∆ ∆ + −
  (4.32) 
( )
2 2 2
32
16 ( )
( ) 8
MRG
c mM c c k
k
ητ β γτ γpi
η γ η τ
− −∂
=
∂ ∆ ∆ + −
    (4.33) 
From (4.33) we can observe that the manufacturer profit decreases as the government 
subsidy increases ( / ) 0MRGMpi η∂ ∂ < . 
We prove that the retailer’s profit increases as the government subsidy increases. The 
retailer’s profit in MRG model is shown in (4.34). 
( )
2 2
22 2
4( ( ))
8 ( )
MRG c m
R
c c k
k
β αγ γ τ
pi
γ γ η τ
− − +
=
− ∆ +
    (4.34) 
By substituting (4.31) into (4.34), we have 
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( )
2 2
22
4( )
( ) 8
MRG c m
R
c c k
k
β γτ γ
pi
γ γ η τ
− −
=
∆ ∆ + −
    (4.35) 
( )
2 2 2
32
8 ( )
( ) 8
MRG
c mR c c k
k
τ β γτ γpi
η γ η τ
∆ − −∂
= −
∂ ∆ ∆ + −
    (4.36) 
From (4.36) we can observe that the retailer profit increases as the government 
subsidy increases ( / ) 0MRGRpi η∂ ∂ > .We provide more numerical examples including specific 
numbers by comparing manufacturer’s profit when 0η =  with manufacturer’s profit when 
6η =  in Appendix C.  
Manufacturer Profit
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Figure 24.  Manufacturer’s profit with variation of η  
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Figure 25.  Retailer’s profit with variation of η  
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Figure 26 shows that the channel profit in MRG and CCG model. It is shown that the 
total channel profit (the central planner profit) in CCG model is always greater than the total 
channel profit (the manufacturer and retailer profit) in MRG model. Figure 26 shows that the 
difference between *MRGCpi  and 
*CCG
Cpi  becomes a smaller as η  increases.  
Channel Profit
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32000
34000
36000
38000
40000
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
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Figure 26.  Channel profit with variation of η  
As we have observed through this numerical example (variation of η ): 
1) The remanufacturability increases as the government subsidy for remanufacturing 
increases. 
2) Under the government penalty and subsidy system, we can increase the 
remanufacturability as well as the total channel profit by coordinating the 
manufacturer and the retailer. 
3) When the government increase η  (the subsidy for remanufacturing to the 
manufacturer), the manufacturer’s profit will be decreased due to α (the penalty to 
the consumers) because the profit loss by α  is greater than the profit gain by η . We 
showed that ( / ) 0MRGMpi η∂ ∂ < . 
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CHAPTER 5.  TOTAL SURPLUS (TS) 
In the previous chapter, we formulated and analyzed the manufacturer-retailer with 
government (MRG) model that the government imposes ARF to the consumers and 
subsidizes it to the manufacturer for remanufacturing when the manufacturer considers his 
remanufacturability. In this chapter, we introduce the government’s objective such as total 
surplus maximization. The government in this chapter is considered as policy-maker. The 
government will take the best response functions of the retailer and manufacturer and find the 
optimal value of η  that maximizes the government’s objective function. As a non-profit 
organization, the government’s objective is to maximize total surplus (social welfare) of the 
members of the supply chain. In order to show the efficiency of total surplus with 
government’s penalty and subsidy, we first derive total surplus without government’s penalty 
and subsidy. The total surplus can be described as a summation of individual surplus 
(Tomaru 2006, Hinloopen 1997). Additional notations used in this chapter are explained 
below: 
MRCS :  The consumer surplus in MR model; 
CCCS :  The consumer surplus in CC model; 
MRGCS :  The consumer surplus in MRG model; 
CCGCS :  The consumer surplus in CCG model; 
MRTS :  The government’s total surplus in MR model; 
CCTS :  The government’s total surplus in CC model; 
MRGTS :  The government’s total surplus in MRG model; 
CCGTS :  The government’s total surplus in CCG model; 
  
 
57
5.1  Total Surplus in MR Model 
In this section, we will consider the total surplus including the manufacturer, retailer 
and consumers. Following this we have that 
MR MR MR MR
R MTS CSpi pi= + +      (5.1) 
In (5.1), MRCS  represents the consumer surplus that is defined as the difference 
between consumer benefit and cost: the difference between the total value consumers receive 
from consuming a particular product and the total amount they pay for it. So MRCS  can be 
expressed as 
( ) 2 * 20 ( ) ( )( ) 2 2MRqMR q qCS p dq pq γ γ= − = =∫    (5.2) 
The derivation and graphical expression of consumer surplus in MR and MRG model 
are given in the Appendix B. 
By substituting the *MRq  from Table 1 into (5.2), we have 
( )
2 2
22 2
2( ( ))
8
MR c mc c kCS
k
β γ τ
γ γ τ
− +
=
− ∆
    (5.3) 
By substituting the MRRpi , 
MR
Mpi , and 
MRCS  into the (5.1), we have the total surplus in 
MR model. 
( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (14 )
8
MR c mc c k kTS
k
β γ τ γ τ
γ γ τ
− + − ∆
=
− ∆
   (5.4) 
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5.2  Total Surplus in CC Model 
In this section, we will consider the total surplus including the central planner and 
consumers. Following this we have that 
CC CC CC
CTS CSpi= +      (5.5) 
The CCCS  can be expressed as 
( ) 2 * 20 ( ) ( )( ) 2 2CCqCC q qCS p dq pq γ γ= − = =∫    (5.6) 
By substituting the *CCq  from Table 2 into (5.6), we have 
( )
2 2
22 2
2( ( ))
4
CC c mc c kCS
k
β γ τ
γ γ τ
− +
=
− ∆
    (5.7) 
By substituting the CCCpi  and 
CCCS  into the (5.5), we have the total surplus in CC 
model. 
( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (6 )
4
CC c mc c k kTS
k
β γ τ γ τ
γ γ τ
− + − ∆
=
− ∆
   (5.8) 
5.3  Total Surplus in MRG Model 
In this section, we will consider the government’s total surplus to find optimal value 
of subsidy for remanufacturing that maximizes the objective function in (5.9) in MRG model.  
Following this we have that 
MRG MRG MRG MRG
R MTS CSMax
η
pi pi= + +     (5.9) 
The MRGCS  can be expressed as 
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( ) 2 * 20 ( ) ( )2 2N MRGqMRG N NN N N q qCS p dq p q γ γ= − = =∫   (5.10) 
By substituting the *MRGNq  from Table 8 into (5.10), we have 
( )
2 2
22 2
2( ( ))
8 ( )
MRG c mc c kCS
k
β αγ γ τ
γ γ η τ
− − +
=
− ∆ +
    (5.11) 
By substituting the equilibrium solution of MRGRpi , 
MRG
Mpi , and 
MRGCS   into (5.9), we 
can obtain the government’s total surplus maximization objective. The government 
maximization function of TS (Total Surplus) is shown in (5.12).  
( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (14 ( ) )
8 ( )
MRG c mc c k kTSMax
kη
β αγ γ τ γ η τ
γ γ η τ
− − + − ∆ +
=
− ∆ +
  (5.12) 
As stated in Assumption 7, we try to see the effect of government intervention where 
money that is taken at a retail purchase, is returned at remanufacturing to the manufacturer. 
Taking that, we notice that the government faces a constraint N Nq R qα η τ= from (4.1).  
By substituting *MRGR  from Table 8 into (4.1), we can get the relationship between α  
and η . 
2
2
( ) ( )
8 ( )
c mc c
k
η η τ β γτ γ
α
γ η τ
∆ + − −
=
− ∆ ∆ +
    (5.13) 
By substituting (5.13) into (5.12), 
( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (14 ( ) )
8 ( )
MRG c mc c k kTSMax
kη
β γ τ γ η τ
γ γ η τ
− + − ∆ +
=
− ∆ ∆ +
   (5.14) 
From (5.14),  
2 2 22
2 2 4
4 ( ) (32 (13 8 ))
( ( ) 8 )
MRG
c mc c k kTS
k
τ β γτ γ γ η
η γ η τ
− + + − ∆ ∆ −∂
= −
∂ ∆ ∆ + −
   (5.15) 
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As we assumed that k  is sufficiently large so we have 
2
2 0
MRGTS
η
∂
<
∂
. Therefore 
MRGTS  is a concave function on the subsidy η  implying that the government’s subsidy is 
single valued. The first order condition for maximizing the government’s objective is given 
by (5.16). 
( )
2 2 2
32
4(3 4 ) ( ) 0
8 ( )
MRG
c mc c kTS
k
η τ β γτ γ
η γ η τ
∆ − − −∂
= =
∂
− ∆ ∆ +
   (5.16) 
Solving (5.16) the government’s optimal subsidy in MRG model is as provided by 
(5.17). 
* 3
4
MRGη = ∆       (5.17) 
By substituting *MRGη  from (5.17) into the (5.13), we have *MRGα . 
2 2
*
2 2
21 ( )
4(32 7 )
MRG c mc c
k
τ β γτ γ
α
γ τ
∆ − −
=
− ∆
   (5.18) 
By substituting *MRGη  into the (5.14), we can obtain *MRGTS . 
2
*
2 2
7( )
(32 7 )
MRG c mc c kTS
k
β γτ γ
γ γ τ
− −
=
− ∆
   (5.19) 
5.4  Total Surplus in CCG Model 
In this section, we will consider the government’s total surplus to find optimal value 
of subsidy for remanufacturing that maximizes the objective function in (5.20) in CCG 
model.  
Following this we have that 
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CCG CCG CCG
CTS CSMax
η
pi= +      (5.20) 
The CCGCS  in (5.20) can be expressed as 
( ) 2 * 20 ( ) ( )2 2N CCGqCCG N NN N N q qCS p dq p q γ γ= − = =∫    (5.21) 
By substituting the *CCGNq  from Table 9 into (5.21), we have 
( )
2 2
22 2
2( ( ))
4 ( )
CCG c mc c kCS
k
β αγ γ τ
γ γ η τ
− − +
=
− ∆ +
     (5.22) 
By substituting the equilibrium solution of CCGCpi  and 
CCGCS   into (5.20), we can 
obtain the government’s total surplus maximization objective in CCG model. The 
government maximization function of TS (Total Surplus) is shown in (5.23).  
( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (6 ( ) )
4 ( )
CCG c mc c k kTSMax
kη
β αγ γ τ γ η τ
γ γ η τ
− − + − ∆ +
=
− ∆ +
  (5.23) 
As stated in Assumption 7, we try to see the effect of government intervention where 
money that is taken at a retail purchase, is returned at remanufacturing to the manufacturer. 
Taking that, we notice that the government faces a constraint N Nq R qα η τ= from (4.1).  
By substituting *CCGR  from Table 9 into (4.1), we can get the relationship between α  
and η . 
2
2
( ) ( )
4 ( )
c mc c
k
η η τ β γτ γ
α
γ η τ
∆ + − −
=
− ∆ ∆ +
    (5.24) 
By substituting (5.24) into (5.23), 
( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (6 ( ) )
4 ( )
CCG c mc c k kTSMax
kη
β γ τ γ η τ
γ γ η τ
− + − ∆ +
=
− ∆ ∆ +
   (5.25) 
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From (5.25),  
2 2 22
2 2 4
4 ( ) (8 (5 4 ))
( ( ) 4 )
CCG
c mc c k kTS
k
τ β γτ γ γ η
η γ η τ
− + + − ∆ ∆ −∂
= −
∂ ∆ ∆ + −
   (5.26) 
As we assumed that k  is sufficiently large so we have 
2
2 0
CCGTS
η
∂
<
∂
. Therefore 
CCGTS  is a concave function on the subsidy η  implying that the government’s subsidy is 
single valued. The first order condition for maximizing the government’s objective is given 
by (5.27). 
( )
2 2 2
32
4( 2 ) ( ) 0
4 ( )
CCG
c mc c kTS
k
η τ β γτ γ
η γ η τ
∆ − − −∂
= =
∂
− ∆ ∆ +
   (5.27) 
Solving (5.27) the government’s optimal subsidy in CCG model is as provided by 
(5.28). 
* 1
2
CCGη = ∆       (5.28) 
By substituting *CCGη  from (5.28) into the (5.24), we have *CCGα . 
2 2
*
2 2
3 ( )
16 6
CCG c mc c
k
τ β γτ γ
α
γ τ
∆ − −
=
− ∆
   (5.29) 
By substituting *CCGη  into the (5.25), we can obtain *CCGTS . 
2
*
2 2
3( )
(8 3 )
CCG c mc c kTS
k
β γτ γ
γ γ τ
− −
=
− ∆
   (5.30) 
The TS (Total Surplus) in each model is summarized in Table 14.  
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Table 14.  The optimal TS (Total Surplus)  
*MRTS  ( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (14 )
8
c mc c k k
k
β γ τ γ τ
γ γ τ
− + − ∆
− ∆
 
*CCTS  ( )
2 2 2
22 2
( ( )) (6 )
4
c mc c k k
k
β γ τ γ τ
γ γ τ
− + − ∆
− ∆
 
*MRGTS  
2
2 2
7( )
(32 7 )
c mc c k
k
β γτ γ
γ γ τ
− −
− ∆
 
*CCGTS  
2
2 2
3( )
(8 3 )
c mc c k
k
β γτ γ
γ γ τ
− −
− ∆
 
5.5  Numerical Examples 
We will show the numerical examples in both MRG and CCG model to illustrate the 
total surplus of the government. Also, the government subsidy η  for remanufacturing in 
MRG and CCG model was varied 0 to 20 while all other parameters were held constant. The 
total surplus in MR and CC has the value where the government’s penalty and subsidy are 
zero. Figure 27 shows the total surplus in MRG model when the government subsidy η  
varies. We can get the optimal value of η  ( * 7.5MRGη = ). Figure 28 shows the total surplus in 
CCG model and we also can get the optimal value of η  ( * 5.0CCGη = ). Through this 
numerical example, we can see that the government can improve the total surplus by 
introducing the optimal value of subsidy and penalty that maximize the total surplus.  
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Figure 27.  Total surplus with variation of η  in MRG 
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Figure 28.  Total surplus with variation of η  in CCG 
However, we checked that the manufacturer and central planner’s profits decrease as 
the subsidy increases from the Figure 24 and 26. Even if the government subsidizes the fee 
collected from consumers into the manufacturer or the central planner for remanufacturing, 
the manufacturer and central planner’s profit will be decreased due to the penalty to the 
consumers. For this reason, we have another research question: how we can increase the 
manufacturer or central planner’s profit to compensate the profit loss by the government 
penalty and subsidy system?  
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Table 15.  Government’s lump-sum transfer money system 
MRG Model CCG Model 
η  MRG
Rpi  
MRG
Mpi  
MRGCS  MRGTS  η  MRGCpi  CCGCS  CCGTS  
0 10171.12 20183.31 5085.56 35440.0 0 40686.98 20666.40 61353.4 
7.5 10293.22 20092.13 5146.16 35530.6 5.0 40520.33 20998.39 61518.7 
 +121.20 -91.17 60.60 +90.63  -166.65 +331.9 +165.33 
 
Table 15 shows the lump-sum transfer money system in both MRG and CCG model. 
Andrei (1985) assume that the lump-sum money T  can be collected, and that the government 
does not care about the distribution of income between the firm and consumers so that the 
lump-sum transfers do not affect welfare. The lump-sum transfer money T  in (5.33) and 
(5.34) does not affect the government’s total surplus and the equilibrium of the manufacturer 
and central planner so that we can increase the manufacturer and central planner’s profits to 
compensate the profit loss by the government penalty and subsidy system 
,
2
( )( ( ( ) ))
( ( ( ) ))
MRG
m c N
w R
N
TS w c R c p wMax
kR R p w T
τ τ β γ α
η τ β γ α
= − + ∆ − − +
− + − + +
   (5.33) 
,
2
( )( ( ))
( ( ))
CCG
N m c N
p R
N
TS p c R c pMax
kR R p T
τ τ β γ α
η τ β γ α
= − + ∆ − − +
− + − + +
    (5.34) 
As we have observed through this numerical example (TS with variation of η ): 
1) When the government increase η  (the subsidy for remanufacturing to the 
manufacturer), the manufacturer and central planner’s profit will be decreased due to 
α  (the penalty to the consumers). The government penalty and subsidy system leads 
to the higher remanufacturability and lower manufacturer and central planner’s 
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profits. Thus the lump-sum transfer money incentive may be provided to the 
manufacturer or the central planner to increase his profits as well as the 
remanufacturabilities.  
2) The government may be able to increase the total surplus consisting of all the profits 
of the supply chains and the consumer surplus by determining the appropriate level of 
the fee unit remanufactured subsidy and the fee unit sold advance recovery fee. 
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CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1  Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to model and analyze the remanufacturability when the 
manufacturer collects used products directly from consumers in a manufacturer-retailer (MR) 
closed loop supply chain. We formulated the MR model when the collection rate is a 
parameter as a Stackelberg game, performed analysis of the equilibrium and compared the 
MR model equilibrium with the CC model equilibrium. Assuming linear demand function, 
we found that lack of coordination in the MR model is resulting in a higher price and lower 
remanufacturability compared to the CC model. We also showed that the remanufacturability 
increases as cost savings from remanufacturing increases. In addition, we found that the total 
cost savings from remanufacturing should be greater than the total collection cost and 
remanufacturability investment cost in order that the remanufacturing is profitable. 
Furthermore, based on these frameworks (MR and CC model) we introduce the 
government penalty to the consumer (ARF) and subsidy to the manufacturer for 
remanufacturing. We found that the remanufacturability increases as the government subsidy 
for remanufacturing increases. We showed that under the government revenue neutrality 
when the government increases the subsidy for remanufacturing to the manufacturer, the 
manufacturer’s profit is decreased due to the penalty to the consumers because the profit loss 
by the consumer penalty is greater than the profit gain by remanufacturing subsidy. In other 
words, the remanufacturing subsidy which is subsidized from the consumer penalty, it leads 
to the higher remanufacturability but lower manufacturer’s profit. Thus the lump-sum 
transfer money incentive may be provided to the manufacturer to increase the manufacturer’s 
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profit. The lump-sum transfer money may compensate the manufacturer’s profit loss by the 
government penalty and subsidy system.  
Last, we showed the total surplus that the government finds the optimal value of 
subsidy and penalty that maximizes the government’s objective as total surplus 
maximization. This paper found that the total surplus without the government environmental 
legislation is improved by introducing the optimal value of subsidy and penalty. 
6.2  Discussion and Future Research 
The MR and MRG model can be extended in many ways. 
6.2.1  Collection Rate τ  as a Decision Variable 
The manufacturer can increase the collection rate by investing more in collection, 
such as advertising or providing higher incentives for each returned product. If we can model 
the collection cost as a decision variable with a function of collection rate, we would be able 
to find the optimal collection rate for the manufacturer under which the manufacturer 
achieves maximized profit. This would give us a more comprehensive understanding of 
manufacturer’s recovery strategies considering both remanufacturability and collection rate.  
6.2.2  Difference between New and Remanufactured Product 
We assumed that there is no difference between the quality of the manufactured and 
remanufactured product like single use camera and copy machine in our model. However, in 
a cell phones, tires, computers, automotive parts market customers can tell the difference 
between a new product and a remanufactured product (Ferguson and Toktay 2004). 
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6.2.3  Environmental Fee Consideration (Registration Fee) 
In this thesis we address the Advanced Recovery Fee (ARF) and the remanufacturing 
subsidy by government. However, there exist several different kinds of penalty and subsidy 
system like Manufacturer Registration Fee in State of Maryland. To be specific, it requires 
manufacturers to register with the Department of the Environment on and submit an initial 
$5,000 registration fee. It applies to manufacturers that manufactured an average of more 
than 1,000 computers per year in the immediately preceding 3-year period. The registration 
fee will be paid into the State Recycling Trust Fund. The funds will be used to provide grants 
to counties to develop and implement local recycling plans. If we can extend our model in 
such a way that the government imposes penalty to the manufacturer for the product sold, we 
are able to provide some managerial insights for various government penalty and subsidy 
systems.  
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APPENDIX A.  DEMAND SHIFT CAUSED BY ARF 
Consider the generic equation of the demand line: 
q pβ γ= − ( , 0)β γ >      (A.1) 
This can be rewritten as inverse demand function: 
1p qβ
γ γ
= −       (A.2) 
which is the line that we graph in the usual diagram with p , the variable on the vertical axis, 
expressed as a function of q . See Figure 29. Now consider the effect of α  (ARF) from 
consumers to buy this good. This is equivalent to a shift to the left (or downward) of the 
demand line, exactly equal to the amount of α . That is: 
1( )p qβ α
γ γ
= − −      (A.3) 
In the usual economics version, equation (A.3) can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( )q p pβ γα γ β γ α= − − = − +     (A.4) 
 
Figure 29.  The effect of ARF on the original demand line 
β
β
γ
β αγ−
β
α
γ
−
q
p
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APPENDIX B.  CONSUMER SURPLUS 
 
 
 
Figure 30.  The consumer surplus without government 
 
This is CS (Consumer Surplus) without the government penalty and subsidy. The 
derivation of consumer surplus in this model is 
* * 0
0 0 0 0 0
2 2
0 0
0 0 0
,
( )1 1 (225.51)( ) ( ( )) 5085.25
2 2 2 2 5
qWhen p p q q q p p
q qCS q p q
ββ γ
γ γ
β β β
γ γ γ γ γ
= = = − = −
= × − = × − − = = =
×
 (B.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
q
p
Demand  q pβ γ= −
( 1000, 5)β γ= =
200 β
γ
=
1000β =
*
0154.9 p=
*
0 225.51q =
CS 
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Figure 31.  The consumer surplus with government penalty and subsidy 
 
The dotted line is old demand function ( q pβ γ= − ) when there is no government 
penalty and subsidy system. 
The CS in the Figure 31 is Consumer Surplus with the government penalty and 
subsidy. The derivation of consumer surplus by graphical expression in this model is 
2 2
1 1( ) ( ( ))
2 2
( ) (226.6) 5134.75
2 2 5
N
N N N
N
qCS q p q
q
β β β
α α α
γ γ γ γ
γ
= × − − = × − − − −
= = =
×
   (B.2) 
q
p
Old Demand  q pβ γ= −
( 6.0, 1.36, 1000, 5)η α β γ= = = =
200 β
γ
=
1000β =
*
0154.9 p=
*
0 225.51q =
CS 
New Demand including 
government ARF and Subsidy  
993.2
β αγ−
=
198.64 β α
γ
= −
* 226.6Nq =
*153.32 Np=
*154.68 Np α= +
( )N Nq pβ γ α= − +
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APPENDIX C.  THE EFFECT OF THE SUBSIDY AND PENALTY 
 
Table 16.  Manufacturer’s profit with both subsidy and penalty 
Both Subsidy and Penalty 
η  α  R  w  Np  NP α+  Nq  MRGMpi  Difference 
0 0 0.28 109.80 154.90 154.90 225.51 20183.31 
-58.21 
6 1.36 0.45 108.01 153.32 154.68 226.58 20125.10 
 
 
 
Table 17.  Manufacturer’s profit with only subsidy 
Only Subsidy 
η  α  R  w  Np  NP α+  Nq  MRGMpi  Difference 
0 0 0.28 109.80 154.90 154.90 225.51 20183.31 
+251.00 
6 0 0.46 108.70 154.30 154.30 228.30 20434.31 
 
 
Table 18.  Manufacturer’s profit with only penalty 
Only Penalty 
η  α  R  w  Np  NP α+  Nq  MRGMpi  Difference 
0 0 0.28 109.80 154.90 154.90 225.51 20183.31 
-305.42 
0 1.36 0.28 109.10 153.90 155.20 223.80 19877.89 
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APPENDIX D.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLES: MR AND CC MODEL 
 
Table 19.  Numerical example of MR model 
β   γ  cc  mc  ∆  τ  k  R  w  p  q  MRRpi  MRMpi  MRCpi  
1000 5 2 20 5 0.5 2000 0.14 110.3 155.2 224.2 10052.0 20064.8 30116.9 
1000 5 2 20 6 0.5 2000 0.17 110.2 155.1 224.4 10069.4 20082.1 30151.5 
1000 5 2 20 7 0.5 2000 0.20 110.2 155.1 224.6 10089.9 20102.6 30192.5 
1000 5 2 20 8 0.5 2000 0.22 110.1 155.0 224.9 10113.7 20126.3 30240.0 
1000 5 2 20 9 0.5 2000 0.25 109.9 155.0 225.2 10140.8 20153.2 30293.9 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 0.28 109.8 154.9 225.5 10171.1 20183.3 30354.4 
1000 5 2 20 11 0.5 2000 0.31 109.6 154.8 225.9 10204.8 20216.7 30421.6 
1000 5 2 20 12 0.5 2000 0.34 109.5 154.7 226.3 10242.0 20253.5 30495.4 
1000 5 2 20 13 0.5 2000 0.37 109.3 154.7 226.7 10282.5 20293.6 30576.1 
1000 5 2 20 14 0.5 2000 0.40 109.1 154.6 227.2 10326.6 20337.0 30663.7 
1000 5 2 20 15 0.5 2000 0.43 108.9 154.4 227.8 10374.3 20383.9 30758.3 
1000 5 2 20 10 0 2000 0.00 110.0 155.0 225.0 10125.0 20250.0 30375.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.1 2000 0.06 110.1 155.0 224.8 10108.8 20211.3 30320.2 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.2 2000 0.11 110.1 155.0 224.8 10105.3 20185.3 30290.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.3 2000 0.17 110.0 155.0 224.9 10114.4 20172.0 30286.4 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.4 2000 0.23 109.9 155.0 225.1 10136.3 20171.3 30307.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 0.28 109.8 154.9 225.5 10171.1 20183.3 30354.4 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.6 2000 0.34 109.6 154.8 226.0 10219.1 20208.2 30427.3 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.7 2000 0.40 109.3 154.7 226.7 10280.5 20246.2 30526.8 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.8 2000 0.46 109.0 154.5 227.6 10355.9 20297.6 30653.4 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.9 2000 0.51 108.6 154.3 228.5 10445.6 20362.4 30808.1 
1000 5 2 20 10 1 2000 0.57 108.1 154.1 229.7 10550.3 20441.3 30991.6 
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Table 20.  Numerical example of CC model 
β   γ  cc  mc  ∆  τ  k  R  p  q  CCCpi  
1000 5 2 20 5 0.5 2000 0.28 110.1 449.3 40208.3 
1000 5 2 20 6 0.5 2000 0.34 110.0 450.0 40277.8 
1000 5 2 20 7 0.5 2000 0.39 109.8 451.0 40360.3 
1000 5 2 20 8 0.5 2000 0.45 109.6 452.0 40455.8 
1000 5 2 20 9 0.5 2000 0.51 109.4 453.2 40564.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 0.57 109.1 454.6 40687.0 
1000 5 2 20 11 0.5 2000 0.63 108.8 456.1 40823.1 
1000 5 2 20 12 0.5 2000 0.69 108.4 457.8 40973.1 
1000 5 2 20 13 0.5 2000 0.75 108.1 459.6 41137.5 
1000 5 2 20 14 0.5 2000 0.81 107.7 461.6 41316.6 
1000 5 2 20 15 0.5 2000 0.87 107.2 463.8 41510.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 0 2000 0.00 110.0 450.0 40500.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.1 2000 0.11 110.0 449.8 40435.3 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.2 2000 0.23 110.0 450.1 40421.3 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.3 2000 0.34 109.8 451.0 40458.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.4 2000 0.45 109.5 452.5 40546.3 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 0.57 109.1 454.6 40687.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.6 2000 0.69 108.5 457.3 40881.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.7 2000 0.81 107.9 460.6 41132.1 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.8 2000 0.93 107.1 464.6 41440.8 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.9 2000 1.06 106.1 469.3 41810.7 
1000 5 2 20 10 1 2000 1.19 105.1 474.7 42245.3 
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APPENDIX E.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLES: MRG AND CCG MODEL 
 
 
 
 
Table 21.  Numerical example of MRG model 
β   γ  cc  mc  ∆  τ  k  η  α  R  w  Np  Np α+  Nq  MRGRpi  MRGMpi  MRGCpi  
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 0.0 0.00 0.28 109.8 154.9 154.9 225.5 10171.1 20183.3 30354.4 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 2.0 0.34 0.34 109.3 154.5 154.8 225.9 10203.2 20176.9 30380.1 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 4.0 0.79 0.40 108.7 154.0 154.8 226.2 10235.5 20157.5 30393.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 6.0 1.36 0.45 108.0 153.3 154.7 226.6 10267.9 20125.1 30393.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 8.0 2.04 0.51 107.2 152.6 154.6 226.9 10300.5 20079.5 30380.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 10.0 2.84 0.57 106.2 151.7 154.5 227.3 10333.2 20020.6 30353.8 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 12.0 3.76 0.63 105.2 150.7 154.5 227.7 10366.1 19948.2 30314.3 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 14.0 4.79 0.68 104.0 149.6 154.4 228.0 10399.1 19862.3 30261.4 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 16.0 5.94 0.74 102.7 148.4 154.3 228.4 10432.3 19762.7 30195.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 18.0 7.21 0.80 101.3 147.0 154.2 228.8 10465.7 19649.3 30115.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 20.0 8.59 0.86 99.8 145.6 154.2 229.1 10499.2 19521.9 30021.1 
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Table 22.  Numerical example of CCG model 
β   γ  cc  mc  ∆  τ  k  η  α  R  Np  Np α+  Nq  CCGCpi  
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 0.0 0.00 0.57 109.08 109.08 454.6 40687.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 2.0 0.68 0.68 108.11 108.79 456.1 40660.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 4.0 1.60 0.80 106.90 108.50 457.5 40580.7 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 6.0 2.75 0.92 105.45 108.21 459.0 40446.2 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 8.0 4.14 1.04 103.77 107.91 460.5 40256.2 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 10.0 5.77 1.15 101.84 107.61 461.9 40009.6 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 12.0 7.65 1.27 99.67 107.31 463.4 39705.2 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 14.0 9.76 1.39 97.25 107.01 464.9 39342.0 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 16.0 12.13 1.52 94.58 106.71 466.4 38918.8 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 18.0 14.74 1.64 91.66 106.41 468.0 38434.4 
1000 5 2 20 10 0.5 2000 20.0 17.61 1.76 88.49 106.10 469.5 37887.8 
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